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On the "Blessed Assurance" of 
"White Male Ways of Knowing": 
Examining Confessional Discourses on Racism 
By Joel Woller 
Carnegie-Mellon University 
''Interrogate whiteness:" such is the order of the· day. As Henry Giroux 
describes it, the task is to: · 
rewrite the poli?cs .of r~presentation around race and difference by 
deconstructtng m h1stor1cal and relational terms not only the central 
categories of 'Otherness,' but also the dominant discourses and repre-
sentations that secure 'whiteness' as a universalizing norm (9-10). 
The po~tion j~t de~cribed, which Giroux attributes to bell hooks, among 
others, ts of a piece with recent calls for white self-critique-calls which seem 
to be .at l.eas~ partly motivated by a desire to avoid dynamics of political 
org~tlon ~ which tokenized others bear the burden of reforming liberal 
whit~s. ~u~, ma persuasive analysis of the contemporary identity crisis of the 
~ft m Britain, Kobena Mercer proposes a narrative which emphasizes the 
Importance of understanding the politics of identity in relation to questions of 
coalition and alliance. 
The official discourse of anti-racism failed precisely because it im-
posed a one-dimensional view of racial antagonism in practices such 
as 'racism awareness training', which simply reinforced existing 
relations of minority representation. Problems of tokenism-in which 
the one black person on the committee or in the organisation is 
positioned, or rather burdened, with the role of a 'representative' who 
'speaks for' the entire community from which he or she comes-were 
left intact. Black subjects historically marginalised from political 
representation by exclusionary practices reproduced within the Left 
were legitimately angry. But the encoding of such anger often took the 
displaced form of 'guilt tripping' in which potential allies were 
parylsed by the sins of their past. White activists recognised the 
untenable innocence of their conciliatory liberal pluralism, but with-
out a common set of terms in which to share openly criticism and 
disagreements, alliance-building was inhibited by the fear of being 
seen to be 'incorrect' and not 'ideologically right on' (67-8). 
. As far as I know, however, no one has suggested that the proposed and I 
think salutary shift from "racism awareness" to white self-critique is in any 
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sense complete. Moreover, I suspect that the paralyzing sense of guilt Mercer 
describes runs rampant in recent attempts by "righteous white people to begin 
to fully explorethewaywhitesupremacy determines how [we] seetheworld."1 
Such attempts to articulate white self-critique tend to find their way to repre-
sentation in the generic form of the confession. 
To be sure, it would seem that an element of guilt is built-in to the notion 
of white interrogation of whiteness; the question, it seems to me, is how such 
guilt is to be used and expressed. I will argue that the particular guilt-inflected 
form of knowledge associated with confession is radically inadequate to the 
task of white self-critique. Thus, any attempt to grasp the conditions of white 
anti-racist work and the particular responsibilities of Euro-american intellectu- I 
als must address, among other things, the dynamics of the confession as a genre. 
In the first portion of this essay, I will trace the confessional management of 
white guilt to discourses of Black Power, but I will also show that a significantly 
different, and much neglected, understanding of white guilt also inhabited the 
Black Power paradigm; to this extent I question prevailing assumptions about 
the necessary political inefficacy of white guilt. Likewise, in order to begin to 
set an agenda for a politically savvy engagement with white guilt, I will devote 
the latter portion of the essay to a reading of Allan Gurganis' tale "Blessed 
Assurance." A general discussion of the confession as a genre will serve to 
bridge my reading of Gurganis and my analysis of Black Power. I 
In order to preface my remarks on the relations between Black Power and 
white guilt, however, I cite a review of bell hooks' Yearning: Race, Gender, and 
Cultural Politics. The review, which will inform my entire discussion, con-
cludes as follows: 
And despite the obvious problems involved [in reading hooks' am-
bivalence toward white allies], I want white men and women to read 
hooks. We won't find our way through these problems if we don't 
confront them, and reading hooks is a good place to start. I found that 
she pushed me to go beyond my tired and self-serving responses to 
racial issues. I'm pretty sure reading her work will do the same for 
others .... Wrestling with the issues that hooks raises for white readers 
will propel us toward ways of responding to black authors that are not 
racist; ways of responding that move between criticism and self-
criticism in an effort to expose, not bury, the problematic nature of 
reading and writing in black and white. 
In his reference to "problems involved," elaborated elsewhere in the 
review, the reviewer alludes to an important tension which is pervasive in 
Yearning and in much contemporary anti-racist work generally: on one hand, 
hooks affirms the importance of both the "interrogation of whiteness" and 
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"persistent self-critique" (54-5). She thus implies the possibility of a white self-
critique which might not exploit otherness-that is, the possibility of a white 
self-critique which might not simply "construct African-American culture as 
though it exists solely to suggest new aesthetic and political directions white 
folks might move in" (Yearning, 21). So, on the one hand, hooks affirms the 
possibility that we who inherit white privilege might nevertheless counter 
white supremacy-especially by means of principled initiatives toward coali-
tion. On the other hand, hooks consistently construes the political potential of 
subject positions close to the hegemonic center in terms of empathy with the 
other, the marginal. This latter position is particularly clear in her essay 
"Representing Whiteness," in which she quotes Gaya tri Spivak to the effect that 
"the holders of hegemonic discourse should de-hegemonize their position and 
themselves learn how to occupy the subject position of the other" (346). But it 
is far from clear that the two positions outlined above can be reconciled: hooks 
wants white people to remember who they are, and yet she contends that it is 
by taking the position of the other that those who are near the hegemonic center 
(for example, Euro-americans) may be able to bolster counter-hegemonic 
2 
movements. 
Thus, to the extent that the reviewer points out the paradox of empathetic 
white anti-racism, his is a laudable intervention into current discussions of 
whiteness in the US and related contexts. There are, however, some disturbing, 
if subtle, implications in the quotation from the review of hooks' book. In 
emphasizing the need to avoid reading black authors in racist ways, the author 
obscures the equally important task of reading white and other non-black 
authors in anti- racist ways. The reviewer not only configures race as what 
hooks terms "an otherness which is not white," but he also (unintentionally, no 
doubt) reinforces the widespread impression that it is blacks who face the 
primary responsibility for producing anti-racist discourses; the only role for 
white$, according to this model, is to "respond" to the initiatives of "black 
authors," others. 
There is also something unsettling about the way in which the reviewer 
announces that he has learned his lesson, both in the quotation I just read and 
elsewhere in the review. (This sense of self-satisfaction is evident in the 
reviewer's persistent recourse to formulations such as "Now I can see .. .. ") The 
subtle but distinct hint of self-righteous satisfaction which can be detected in 
this tendency undermines, at least in part, the reviewer's emphasis on the 
importance of confronting the problematic nature of white anti-racism with a 
degree of self-criticism. Furthermore, in addition to emphasizing the impor-
tance of practices of reading to such an extent that the existence of other social 
practices seems to be forgotten, the reviewer consistently associates the "em-
powerment" of the white anti-racist with making that person feel he can "make 
a difference," thus suggesting, despite some no doubt well-intended disclaim-
disClosure: Fin de Siec/e Democracy 
18 Joel Woller 
ers to the contrary, that the possession of a heightened racial awareness or 
sensitivity is a sufficient condition for effective anti-racist work. 
Mindful of the problems I've just mentioned, but hoping to contribute to 
the reviewer's project of mediating between criticism and self-criticism in the 
context of white identity, I want to emphasize that such a raised consciousness 
is perhaps necessary but certainly not adequate to ta.sk of undermining the 
invisibility and supposed naturalness of whiteness; a "new consciousness" is, 
at best, "the vital first step" {Carmichael and Hamilton, 39). More parti.cularly, 
I propose that an adequate approach to the question of the possibilities for white 
anti-racist intellectual and other work must {at minimum) address the nature 
of the expressive forms through and in which racial and other identities are 
partially constructed. That is, I want to question the reviewer's assumption that 
confession as a genre is to self-criticism what the review as a genre is to criticism, 
and to suggest by way of Gurganis' story that an examination and strategic 
disruption of the confessional genre is a necessary component of the critique of 
white identity. 
The conceptual opposition between criticism and self-criticism invoked by 
the reviewer of hooks' book runs deep in the Black Power paradigm that 
underlies a lot of contemporary discourse on identity in general and on race in 
particular {especially, perhaps, in the US). Stokely Carmichael {now Kwame 
Toure) summed up some implications of this opposition very succinctly in his 
"Speech at Morgan State College:" 
What Camus says is that self-condemnation is impossible. And we in 
SNCC agree with that. Self-condemnation is impossible. [. ... ] 
White America is incapable of condemning that which ithas done to 
black people as a total community inside this country. Therefore we 
must do it, we must condemn {Bosmajian and Bosmajian, 112). 
• 
The "we" in question here is "Black America." There is a great risk in 
Carmichael's position, for in asserting the impossibility of white self-condemna-
tion-which I take to be more or less equivalent to hooks' notion of persistent self-
critique and to her reviewer's concept of self-criticism-Carmichael tends to 
reduce the extent to which whites can be held responsible for countering white 
supremacy. Carmichael was well aware of this problem; thus, in a passage from I • 
the preface to Black Power which closely parallels the passage I just quoted, 
Carmichael and Hamilton insist, parenthetically and somewhat desperately, 
that ~ey o~er '~ideas of what whites can do who want to be helpful" {ix). 
Carnu~ael is driven to conclude that white self-condemnation is impossible by 
comp~~g concerns ab~ut dynamics of coalition in which white attempts at 
self-cnticrsm tend to shift responsibility for racism, in Carmichael's terms, 
"from oppressor to oppressed;" white power is thus turned into a "black 
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problem." Thus in an earlier statement, "Power and Racism," Carmichael had 
contended that 
White supporters of the movement[ .... ] are afraid to go into their own 
communities-which is where the racism exists-and work to get rid 
of it. They want to run from Berkeley to tell us what to do in 
Mississippi; let them look instead at Berkeley. They admonish blacks 
to be non-violent; let them preach nonviolence in the white commu-
nity. They come to teach me Negro h istory; let them go to the suburbs 
and open up freedom schools for whites. Let them work to stop 
America's racist foreign policy; let them press this government to 
cease supporting the economy of South Africa {Bosmajian and 
Bosmajian, 106). 
In other words, the complicity of liberal whites in white supremacy is 
rendered most invisible precisely when Euro-americans identify {and attempt 
to join) with a marginalized racial other. What is lost at this moment is not 
simply a sense of where "the problem" lies, but also perhaps some important 
avenues of resistance that may be more open to whites than to "others." Such 
is the hypothesis or the promise of a white politics of identity, anyway: the idea 
that a politics of whiteness is neither the same old politics of white power, nor 
a direct analog to Black Power {since the strategy of "closing the ranks" which 
Carmichael and Hamilton claim for subalterns is obviously and entirely unjus- · 
tified for a dominant group); {Carmichael and Hamilton, 44).3 
Note that in an earlier version of this argument, in his essay "Power and 
Racism," Carmichael offers a more qualified summary of the thesis that self-
condemnation is impossible. 
Camus and Sartre have asked, can a man condemn himself? Can 
whites, particularly liberal whites, condemn themselves? Can they 
stop blaming us, and blame their own system? Are they capable of the 
shame which might become a revolutionary emotion? 
We have found that they usually cannot condemn themselves, and 
so we have done it. But the rebuilding of this society, if at all possible, 
is basically the responsibility of whites-not blacks {Bosmajian and 
Bosmajian, 107). 
The earlier formulation, which makes its way into the preface to Black 
Power virtually unrevised, leaves open possibilities for white self-critique, but 
at the risk of encouraging facile engagements with the task. On the other hand, 
Carmichael's later formulation- that self-condemnation is impossible-risks 
absolving whites from any significant responsibility for countering racism. 
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The paradox that I've drawn out of Carmichael haunts much of even the 
best work against racism. In "On Being White," for example, Marilyn Frye 
emphasizes the need for whites to assume responsibility for white supremacy, 
and attempts to "set [her]self against Whiteness," to "give [her]self the injunc-
tion to stop being White" (127). Since whiteness is a political rather than a 
natural category, "it can be resisted" (126); "it is in principle possible to 
disaffiliate" (118). Indeed, given that "race is a tie that binds women to men" 
(125) in the con text of compulsory heterosexuality, a radical or lesbian feminism 
is, "whether or not we so intend it, disloyal to Whiteness" (126). Yet she argues 
(persuasively, in my view) that "it is an important breakthrough for a member 
of a dominant group to come to knows/he is a member of a group" (her 
emphasis; 117), and she seems to recognize that she and other queer feminists 
are still at least in part treated as members of the white group. Thus her 
provocative and insightful analysis of the ways in which women, particularly 
lesbians, are removed from the center of dominance goes only part of the way 
toward explaining how the recognition of one's white privilege is compatible 
with the injunction to "stop being white." I 
hooks grapples with and fails to entirely resolve a similar difficulty, as 
noted above in the context of a review of her Yearning. The review to which I've 
been referring appeared in the January 1992 issue of Postmodern Culture, and is 
titled "White Male ways of Knowing." One might suppose that its title would 
be sufficient indication of its author's positionality; nevertheless, in the fourth 
paragraph of the piece the review's author, sociologist Clifford Staples, insists 
on presenting himself as openly white and male. 
OK. What you've mostly gotten so far is the dust-jacket perspective 
of Anyreader-the sort of "view from nowhere" I was taught to write 
in graduate school. It's also the kind of "review" I might have written 
before reading Yearning-before getting my lesson in racial awareness. 
hooks won't let me forget who I am. So, as it turns out, I'm not 
Anyreader. I'm a white guy. 
By using the timing of my revelation of the author's identity to parody the 
particular "outing" technique he himself uses, I do intend to question the "me 
paleface" way in which Staples dramatizes his position. Yet I want to empha-
size that I did not choose to base my polemic on Staples' essay because I consider 
his views to be particularly retrograde; on the contrary, I like his work, and 
comment on it only because I believe it represents one of the better statements 
of wh~t seems . to be the consensus of contemporary Euro-american self-
n:fle~on on whi~ male supremacy. That is, although his work is moving in the 
~e~tion of whi~e self-critique, it remains somewhat awkwardly situated 
within the paradigm of "racial awareness" described above by Mercer." 
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What worries me most is that Staples consistently equates "self-reflection" 
or "self-criticism" with terms like "self-disclosure" and "confession." 
[hooks] forces the white male reader in particular into self-conscious-
ness and self-criticism. 
Her stance also raises the question of just exactly what a "review" of 
her work by me might mean. After thinking it over, I have found 
myself coming to rest in a problematic place somewhere between 
criticism and self-criticism. So my "review" is also, of ne~essity, 
something of a confession. 
His tendency throughout the essay is to suggest that this space between 
criticism and self-criticism is a kind of mixed genre; yet, although he acknowl-
edges the problematic nature of his position, he never considers the natures of 
the genres he's mixing. (Nor does he state what exactly is problematic about his 
position). Contrary to what appears to be Staples' view, one can't simply 
volunteer to create a mixed genre by force of will; so, in the interest of 
determining some conditions of possibility for the elaboration of that space 
which might mediate between criticism and self-criticism in the context of 
whiteness, consider the ambiguous character of the confessional form. 
Confession is neither simply an act of self-disclosure nor an act of self-
criticism (if that term is taken to be opposed to other-criticism). A reading of 
Staples' own piecewillsuggestthatwhatl will calla "successful" or"felicitous" 
confession hides as much as it reveals. A confession in the end represents an 
avoidance of self-condemnation: it is a means of self-preservation: the "I" who 
has sinned is an-other. This paradox follows in part from the temporal aspect 
of the generic confession, the fact that confession is equivalent to accusing a past 
self; the present self is always already absolved, simply by virtue of engaging 
in the act of confession. And as one of Carmichael's main intellectual sources 
has suggested, the purging effect of confession also enables the sender of the 
confession to assume a morally advantaged position with respect to the 
receiver-to remind the receiver of his own guilt, to accuse: in The Fall, Camus' 
narrator makes the accusatory function of confession quite clear. 
Covered with ashes, tearing my hair, my face scored by clawing, but 
with piercing eyes, I stand before all humanity recapitulating my 
shames without losing sight of the effect I am producing, and saying: 
''I was the lowest of the low." Then imperceptibly I pass from the "I" 
to the "we" (140). 
A felicitous confession (such as Staples', perhaps) is in this way a form of 
criticism which masks itself as self-criticism; it is a speech act which already, to 
return to Staples' terms, partakes of both criticism and self-criticism. 
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Moreover, the paradigmatic confession does not tend to produce that sense 
of shame which can, according to Carmichael, become a "revolutionary emcr 
tion;" on the contrary, confession seems to be one of the preferred genres of 
those who continually emphasize the immobilizing character of guilt. 5 The 
apparent paradox is resolved when one remembers the absolution that accom-
panies the acknowledgment of complicity. Confession is a way of passing guilt 
on, not of producing something from it. Confession can work to project the guilt 
of the sender of the confessor on to the receiver because the commw:Ucation 
roles of sender and receiver are both stable and reversible within the confes-
sional form. The sender of the confession projects his (or her) guilt on to the 
receiver, whose job is to make the sender feel better. It is the receiver who 
absolves the narrator of the confession-who, by hearing the confession, 
validates that the sinner is other than the sender of the confession; it is the 
receiver who establishes the truth of the confession, according to a code which 
establishes that someone who ("sincerely") asks for forgiveness must be other 
6 
than a sinner. The receiver can then become sender and pass the guilt along. 
I'll call this means of distributing guilt the production of a "confession effect." 
It seems to me that a lot of white discourse on racism relies rather 
uncritically on the propagation of this confession effect; this is, in my view, one 
of the reasons that "liberal guilt" has quite justifiably gotten a bad name. 
Complicity is invoked routinely, and serves as a great equalizer; the speaker 
confesses to a certain awkwardness about his (or sometimes her) positionality, 
and thus accuses those assumed to be" on deck": an underlying message of this 
discourse is, "We're all racists-the best we can do is say so (and thus feel 
superior to those who refuse or neglect to admit that they too are racists)." And 
if what I've been saying about the nature of the felicitous confession is more or 
less valid, it might be supposed that the unsuccessful confession might be a good 
place to look for the kind of shame to which Carmichael alludes. Allan 
Gurganis' "Blessed Assurance" provides a hint of the form such an infelicitous 
confession might take, for it arguably promotes what I am almost rash enough 
to call "radical," as opposed to liberal, guilt. That is, Gurganis' narrative tends 
to provoke a sense of shame in the reader who recognizes his (or her) white 
privilege; at the same time, his tale does not encourage the strategy of the 
complicitous accuser, the tendency to divest oneself of responsibility even as 
one confesses. Gurganis promotes this particular sense of gull t by denying the 
reader the assurance of the confession effect, and, in particular, by disruptinq 
the basis of said effect, the stability and reversibility of communication roles. 
Thematically, ''Blessed Assurance" concerns the conflict between ''heart" 
and ''business"-the former being linked to a very particular forms of regional, 
moral, and class consciousness, the latter being clearly associated with loyalty 
to family, the American dream, and whiteness. Gurganis' melodrama is about 
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the guilty conscience or "moral insomnia" (266) of the narrator, Jerry, a self-
described "career-oriented," "hyper-Caucasian," working-class kid from Falls, 
NorthCarolina(290). FromJerry'spointofview,evencryingabouthisrelative 
deprivation "seemed a luxury luxury people like me couldn't afford" (260). 
Jerry makes his way through college and to eventual prosperity by selling 
funeral insurance to black people. "I only did it to put myself through college. 
I knew it wasn't right. But my parents worked swing shift at the cotton mill" 
(232). The job requires a complete commodification of social relationships: 
everyone must remain a "client," because, as his boss Sam points out, "once 
they smell heart on you, you're finished." In a moment of need, however, Jerry 
finds himself befriended by one client in particular: one Vesta Lotte Battle, a 
former slave who by 1949 is invested in funeral eventualities to the tune of 
$4,360.50. 
I worried: accepting tea might be my first client-collector mistake. I 
hadn't asked for her tire help, either. Sam had warned me: "Take 
nothing from anybody." But a person can't consider every kindness 
a form of bribe, can a person? Maybe I was a night-school Business 
Major, butI wasn'talways counting. ''Teasoundsgreat,ma'am" (246). 
But it turns out that he is always counting-he must. "I sold funeral 
insurance to North Carolina black people .... Here lately, worry over this takes a 
percentage of my sleep right off the top" (232). Jerry feels guilty whether he 
does his job or not, because his sense of morality is divided between loyalty to 
his family and to his own career potential, on the one hand, and to his heartfelt 
if problematic affection for Vesta Lotte Battle, on the other; for him, business is 
a moral issue: 
I lied for them. I paid. And this stupid generosity made me feel 
ashamed, not good like it's supposed to. I told myself, "You're just too 
weak to give her up. No Princeton pre-law ballplayer would be such 
a sap. You're helping losers, clod, because you are one" (260-261). 
His fleeting mo men ts of insight in to the sense in which both his parents and 
Vesta Lotte Battle "belong" to the mill are not enough to extricate him from the 
deeper structures of whiteness, in part because these moments of awareness are 
generally accompanied by the recognition that acts of charity do not fundamen-
tally challenge the power of the cotton manufacturers. Thus, although Jerry is 
unable to share his employer's cynical attitude toward "the world," he blames 
himself-even as he commits the good deed which he hopes will absolve him 
of his guilt. The alcoholic Sam feels guilty, but is able to continue to rationalize 
his selling funeral insurance. 
You want to be all things to all people, but you can't. Nobody 
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can .... There's no percentage in taking it heart, son. What we're doing 
is rigged, sure, but you know why, Jerry? Because its part of the world 
(304). 
When Jerry quits the funeral insurance business, however, he is more disgusted 
with himself than with the world. "May this job end, and now, Amen. I am not fit 
to earn a living in this world" (italics in original; 298). The contradictions between 
heart and business prove to be irreconcilable. 
Formally, "Blessed Assurance" consists of a series of confessions, pre-
sented retrospectively by a now-retired Jerry, each embedded in a framing 
confession addressed directly to the reader. For example, in a climactic scene 
Jerry feels "half-pardoned" (288) when he attends a black stranger's funeral and 
confesses to the congregation that he has "felt real bad about selling funeral 
insurance" (292). Early in the narrative, likewise, the boss of the insurance 
racket, Sam, confesses to Jerry "the whole rancid truth" about his ''heartless 
business" (236). And about midway through, Jerry confesses to Sam-now 
designated "Uncle Sam" (275)-that he has not been doing his job, which is to 
cancel the funerals of those who miss payments; this confession is recalled at the 
very end of the framing story, when Jerry finally produces the list of his 
company's "nine worst credit risks" for the reader. 
I've never credited any type of heaven. No way. But I still worry for 
the souls I kept from theirs. -Even now I know the names of my nine 
clients I squealed on. They are: 
Betty Seely 
Easton Peel 
'Junior' Turnage 
Carlisle Runyon 
Mary Irene Tatum 
Leota Saiterwaite 
P.M. Hilton 
Minna Smith 
Vesta Lotte Battle 
I still try and imagine her-on hold, rocking between this world and 
the next. I want to either bring her back or send her on toward her 
proper reward. I can't. 
Vesta Lotte Battle owed me $12.50. 
There, I've told you. I'll feel better. Thank you very much (305). 
But he won't feel better. What is most significant about both the framing 
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confession and the embedded confessions is that none of them are felicitous in 
the sense outlined above; none of them produce the much-desired confession 
effect. That is, there are always subtle signs that the sender of the confession 
(Sam or Jerry) doesn't really feel absolved. Hence, for example, the bitter irony 
in Jerry's certainty that he'd feel better once he'd confessed to Sam that he'd 
been protecting his backsliding clients: "I knew I'd feel better," thinks Jerry 
(273). There is a parallel irony in Sam's comment to Jerry: "My job? I'm here 
to make you feel better" (304). LikeJerry,Samseemsto be unable to dohisjob-
for Jerry does not seem to feel better after confessing to Sam: he wakes up in a 
cold sweat, and guilt still taxes his sleep forty years after the event. "I don't 
know-I've kept fretting over this, feeling it for all these years. I mean, basically 
I'm not all that bad of a man, am I? Am I?" (305) 
There is a kind of Brechtian irony at work here, for with respect to 
Gurganis' tale judgments about the characters' actions are clearly meant to take 
place on a conscious plane (Brecht, 91). That is, Gurganis alienates what he 
shows;thiswhitereaderi.Sconsistentlyleftwiththefeelingthatl'vebeenshown 
what I wanted to see, and that yet something is "wrong." Brecht summarizes 
the technique to which I have alluded as follows: 
The Threepenny Opera deals with bourgeois conceptions, not only as 
content by representing them, but also by the way in which they are 
presented. It is a sort of summary of what the spectator in the theatre 
wishes to see of life. Since however he sees, at the same time, certain 
things that he does not wish to see and thus sees his wishes not only 
fulfilled but also criticized (he sees himself not as a subject, but as an 
object), he is, in theory, able to give the theatre a new function (43). 
Likewise, in Gurganis' tale the blessed assurance of whiteness, which is 
supposed to emerge from the confession effect, is constantly promised but 
never delivered. 
Gurganis produces this Brechtian effect by disrupting the stability of the 
division of communication roles. A reader of a narrative such as Staples' can 
easily identify with him, the narrator-protagonist who becomes more and more 
heroic the more that narrator faces the difficult task of confronting his own 
defects; such a reader is not, I would argue, put into any significant crisis of 
conscience.8 I am reminded of Brecht's critique of the audience's reception of 
a performance of Oedipus which had impressed him: ''Plunged in self-
identification with the protagonist's feeling.5, virtually the whole audience 
failed to take part in the moral decisions of which the plot is made up" (28). 
Gurganis' text, on the other hand, tries to force the reader to take a decisive 
role in the action of the narrative (Brecht, 37). To this end, it tends to put its 
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readers into crisis, to divide us, to put us at odds with ourselves. The reader's 
self-alienation is encouraged initially by means of a direct second-person 
address. This formal device works to hail the reader quite unmistakably, and 
then to recast that reader's identity in terms of the subtly alien character of the 
narratee; or rather, this device works to simultaneously remind the reader that 
he (or she) is in fact reading, and to encourage that reader to place the act of 
reading on the same moral and epistemic plane as the action represented in the 
narrative. That is, the reader is rather forcefully asked to combine, the familiar 
and the slightly strange-to recognize himself (or herself) as at the ~e time 
self-authorized reader and as a particular character whose range of action is 
being written by another. (Empirical readers might to one degree or another 
resist the tendency of this device, but it is difficult to see how one could make 
much sense of the story without participating in this process of self-alienation.) 
For the framing narrative's direct second-person address also serves to commit 
the narratee (and to some extent any reader who identifies at least partly with 
the narratee, which is to say pretty much anyone who reads the story) to a very 
specific role within the narrative. Gurganis' piece might for this reason be called 
a "contractual confession," if such a term is not simply redundant, since in the 
very first paragraph the narrator, Jerry, places a certain responsibility upon the 
narratee of the framing discourse. 
I still feel bad about what went on. My wife says: Telling somebody 
might help. Lately, worry over this takes a percentage of my sleep 
right off the top. So I'm telling you, OK? (232) 
In other words, thereader'sjob,likeSam's,isto makeJerryfeel better. Gurganis 
thematiz.es the nature of the confession effect brilliantly, as Jerry consistently 
reminds his" good listener" (279) of the confessor's duty: "And hey, I appreci-
ate your listening" says Jerry (305). "I'm telling you everything. That's our 
deal" (278). 
My wife says: for somebody like me, somebody with a strong head for 
facts, it's even more important to empty out that head from time to 
time. So I am, okay? Clearing the books (274). 
"Clearing the books": by comparing his discourse to the reader and his 
betrayal of Vesta Lotte Battle, Jerry identifies the reader and Sam: Sam, the one 
who accepts Jerry's burden, and then passes the names on to the company 
headquarters in the North. The reader is being asked to share the burden which 
knowledge of that list of names brings. 
Of course, being compared to Sam can hardly make the reader comfortable. 
But the reader is denied access to the confession effect, which is the usual means 
of discharging the kind of anxiety in question. The narratee always fails to 
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upholdhisendofthecontract;thusthereaderwhoidentifiesatleastinpartwith 
the narratee feels a sense of participation with respect to the failure of the 
confession effect. Since Jerry's narration consistently signifies a kind of equiva-
lence between the framing confession and the embedded confessions, and 
among the embedded confessions themselves, distinctions among communica-
tion roles (distinctions between characters and readers, and between narrators 
andnarratees) are blurred: asshownabove,forexample,Jerry as narrator of the 
frame is equated with the Jerry who as character confesses to Sam. The reader 
whose identification is split between the narrator and the narratee is for this 
reason never able to settle on any single communication role within the 
confessional context; he or she is never able to identify in any simple way with 
either the receiver or the sender of a confession, so the guarantee of moral 
superiority which a confessed white liberal reader assumes for himself (or 
herself), the assumption of morality which as expressed in confession shores up 
white identity-this sense of oneself fails to obtain. Once communication roles 
are destabilized, the reversibility of the confession effect is called into question, 
and the reader can no longer be sure that he (or she) is participating in an 
ongoing chain of successful confessions. Normally, after consoling someone 
by hearing a confession and absorbing the guilt which the confession projects 
on to the receiver, the receiver of that confession can then assume the role of 
sender and pass the guilt along. The general failure of confession in "Blessed 
Assurance," however, removes the guarantee of consolation which is implied 
by representations which imply the working of a smoothly functioning com-
munication circuit-representations such as Staples' essay. I imagine the white 
reader of Staples' essay to emerge with a bolstered ego; there is something self-
congratulatory about the way in which this essay provokes and then manages 
feelings of guilt. "Blessed Assurance," on the other hand, stirs up similar 
feelings of guilt, but because it removes the usual means of dispensing with 
such feelings, it tends to place the reader in a state of crisis; the white reader is 
thus encouraged to create new identities and new ways of engaging with guilt, 
though of course no text could guarantee the outcome of such experimentation 
on the part of its readers. 
None of this is to say that Gurganis provides a ready-made alternative to 
the generic confession; nor do I want to suggest that white supremacy can be 
destroyed by means of a little Brechtian irony. I see no formula for elaborating 
Gurganis' essentially literary project in more concrete political terms. My 
argument that Gurganis' novella represents a successful intervention into the 
construction of white identity is intended simply to provide a less negative 
complement to my more critical remarks with respect to Staples. Gurganis 
demonstrates that it is possible to engage with white guilt in such a way as to 
avoid both denial and rei.fication: that is, the reification of whiteness as a given 
about which we can do nothing, and the denial of the effective reality of 
whiteness as a relational and historically contingent social and political con-
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struct. In this way Gurganis' more or less Brechtian tale bears out an increas-
ingly widely-held political and theoretical premise: that an effective politics of 
identity can be neither a purely "humanistic" and realist politics based on the 
assumption of stable identities, nor a purely "post-structuralist" and nominal-
ist politics of relentless difference. A politics of identity is therefore a politics of 
the transformation of existing identities; such a politics both assumes the 
provisional reality of identity and its instability. Particular identities need to be 
disrupted without being denied-or rather, particular identities can be dis-
rupted only when one engages with them: both the fantasy of achieved identity 
and the fantasy of existing beyond identity need to be avoided.9 
By means of my interpretation of Gurganis' tale, then, I've been trying to 
counter Staples' somewhat facile strategy of genre-mixing, and to demonstrate 
in particular some of the easily overlooked complexities which are involved in 
mediating between critique and self-criticism. By means of the form of my 
essay, and in particular by gradually focusing on Gurganis and Staples rather 
than on, say, hooks or Carmichael, I've also been attempting to give illocutionary 
force to my contention that white intellectuals need to stop assuming that others 
are going to tell us what to do to make everything better. Figuring out what we 
who enjoy the privileges of whiteness can and should do about white su· 
premacy is after all our problem, a white problem. There is clearly a danger in 
this strategy, for in a worst-case scenario the shift in focus from blackness to 
whiteness devolves into yet another means of marginalizing that which is 
"other," and there can be no doubt that if the negative consequences of this 
danger do come into being they will be felt most directly and acutely by those 
who do not enjoy the benefits of whiteness. Nevertheless, this strategy of white 
self-critique must be justified even as its dangers are acknowledged and its 
contours modified by self-criticism, for to continue to rely on racial others to tell 
us what to do is t£ perpetuate the insidious idea that white supremacy is, alas, 
"their" problem. 
Endnotes 
1 
2 
hooks, Talking Back, p. 115 
Per~aps I s~ould briefly note a two other concerns with the hooks/ Spivak 
formul~tlon. First, even if hegemonic discourse has the kind of group 
belongmgness hooks. ~ttributes to it, it is not entirely clear that it is possible to 
learn to take the position of the other: can one really learn to give up one's 
accent, o.n~' s access to the cultural capital education brings, or one's credit line? 
Second, it ts far from obvious that it is always politically effective to simply give 
awa~, rather than use, one's privilege. 
Thus, at the "Educational Session on Racism" which paralleled the People 
of Color Caucus at the People's Progressive Convention (in Ypsilanti, Michi-
gan, August 21-23, 1992), one participant str~ed the importance of distin-
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guishing between an educational session and a caucus--a caucus representing 
the interests of groups deserving and requiring such representation, an ed uca-
tional session being a signal that those not represented by a particular caucus 
nevertheless ought to address their own relation to issues faced by members of 
the caucus in question. 
4 In order to substantiate my claim that Staples' piece is very much worth 
considering, I simply offer the following quotation: 
Initially I wasfeelingproudofmyself thatlhad [sic.] stepped out from 
behind the Anyreader persona to proclaim my status as "white 
guy" .... [But] acknowledging one's status is only meaningful as a 
result of what comes after it. In my case, I came to see this essay as an 
occasion for self-reflection and analysis. Stating that one is a "white 
male" won't in itself do that more difficult work. In fact, it might 
inhibit it to the extent that it serves as a sort of politically correct 
~esture .... 
For example, during the "Educational Session on Racism" at the People's 
Progressive Convention (in Ypsilanti, Michigan, August 21-23, 1992), one 
participant who spoke against the format of that meeting argued both (1) that 
we who are not people of color should focus on taking action rather than on 
"cleansing" ourselves, and (2) that racism will remain no matter what we do. 
In other words, he asserted the ineffectivity of shame and at the same time made 
the confession/ accusation that we are all racists; the latter claim, of course, 
seemed in its context to imply that all we can do is learn to live with white 
supremacy, and thus tends to undermine his vague and arguably naive (but 
nevertheless admirable) call for "social revolution." Although I share the 
speaker's concern that such discussions may become too focused on matters of 
consciousness per se, I conclude, for reasons that I hope I have made clear, that 
the overall dynamic of these comments is deeply racist in the context of the 
debate over whether we "need" meetings in which white people are asked to 
think about racism. Indeed, in the end these comments seem to represent an 
attempt to change the subject of the discussion, not an effective means of 
undercutting an overemphasis on states of mind. 
6 Camus' narrator again makes the point: 
I'll agree with you, despite your poll te silence, that the adventure is not 
very pretty. But just think of your life, mon cher compatriotel Search 
your memory and perhaps you will find some similar story that you'll 
tell me later on (65). 
7 
"Blessed Assurance" was first published in Granta. In my citations I will 
refer to the pagination of th~ reprinting which appears in Gurganis' White 
People. 
8 Given my concern with the issues raised by Staples' essay, my reading of 
Gurganis is particularly concerned with the role of the white reader. Readers 
do find interesting ways to resist the main tendencies of particular messages, 
however, so it is impossible to guarantee much of anything about the ways in 
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which "Blessed Assurance" is actually received; for me, Gurganis' story is an 
opportunity, not a guarantee. Likewise, it is important to remember that little 
or nothing can be said about the actual activities of empirical readers on the 
basis of the kind of evidence I have offered. I make no predictions about what 
particular white, black, or "other" readers will do with Gurganis' tale, nor do 
I accept, ultimately, the validity of the misleadingly definite terms ''black" and 
"white." My aim is rather to indicate some of the things that condition the 
messy subjectivities which generally are accounted for ideologically and 
struggled over politically in terms of rigidly defined racial difference . . 
Perhapslshouldalsopointoutthatinthises.saylhaveconsistentlyworked 
within the confines of a code in whrch racial otherness is black (and specifically 
African American). This is not because I believe that racial conflict can be 
reduced to a black-white paradigm, but rather because in the context of 
the contemporary US the black-white nexus provides a particularly good 
opportunity for an examination of white guilt-an opportunity not afforded, 
for example, by the relation of whites to the so-called "model minorities." 
9 It seems to me that the premises of an effective identity politics have been 
worked through most clearly in feminist, and especially queer feminist, projects. 
See, e.g., DeLauretis; Fuss. 
10 A version of this es.say was presented at the conference ''Rediscovering 
America, 1492-1992: National, Cultural and Disciplinary Boundaries 
Reexamned" (Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge; February 26-29, 1992). 
I thank everyone who participated in the conference, especially panel chair 
Prof. Nancy Caraway (Government, American University) and conference co-
chair Prof. Joseph V. Ricapito (Foreign Languages and Literatures, Louisiana 
State University). Thanks are also due to Prof. R.A.T. Judy (English, University 
of Pittsburgh), Prof. Julian Markels (English, Ohio State University), and Prof. 
~lene Longenecker (English, Ohio State University), who read early drafts of 
thJS essay; needless to say, they bear no responsibility for the limitations and 
deficiencies of my work. 
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